

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THE CASE OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ORGANIZATION IN EGYPT

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ABSTRACT

International Law consists of a set of rules and principles of general application dealing with the conduct of States and of international organizations in their international relations with one another. International law has two main subjects, first the state and second, the international organizations which are categorized into governmental and non-governmental organizations. The state is main subject of international law, without which international law as a law can never exist. Therefore endeavors to abolish states are considered a trial to abolish international law. Moreover, international rules are established to establish the rights and obligations of states and to ensure the peaceful context where these rules are applied. Hence, the existence of international law rests upon the existence of its main subjects, the states, and the prevalence and salience of peace and security supported by its rules and principles. Muslim brotherhood (MB), as a nongovernmental organization, embracing certain beliefs and principles concerning their ideas about the prospective desired Islamic state and the rules which would govern the world attempt to destroy international law and to prevail violence and anarchy instead of peace and discipline. Therefore, corrective steps need to be taken. This paper is divided into five parts. The first part sheds some light on a background about the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The second part focuses on the main tenets of MB ideology. The third part deals with the major goal of MB, the establishment of the Islamic state. The fourth part identifies the essential means for achieving this goal. The last part concludes with the required corrective steps to bring the non-governmental organizations under greater control.

KEYWORDS: Containment Strategy, Islamic State, Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Muslim Brotherhood Ideology, Jahili Societies (Ignorant), Jihad (Fighting)

INTRODUCTION

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD: BACKGROUND

After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved as a state in July 1923, and the nation of Turkey was formally established thereafter. Mustapha Kemal, who was given the title "Ataturk" or "Father of the Turks" was the founder and first President of Turkey.¹ A war hero and a national figure, Ataturk attempted to abolish all Islamic influence in Turkey in favor of European influences and establish secular rule. Ataturk (1) abolished the Caliphate, (2) banned the growing of beards by men and wearing of scarves by women, (3) banned the call to prayer by Muezzins, (4) abolished Arabic script and replaced it with Latin script, and (5) made the Turkish military the custodians of secular tradition.² Dissolving the Islamic Caliphate and transforming Turkey from the center of the Islamic world to a non-Muslim secular nation did not sit well with the global Muslim community (Ummah). In 1928, the son of a Muslim Imam outside of Cairo,

¹ Strategic Engagement Report, (2008), Brief History of the Muslim Brotherhood, p1.

² Ibid, p 1.

Egypt named Hassan al Banna created the Muslim Brotherhood. This organization, known as the Society of Muslim Brothers (the Muslim Brotherhood) or *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, was created to merge the Islamic countries under the flag of a unified Islamic state, expand the Caliphate, and subordinate all lands under the Caliphate to the Shari'ah (Islamic Law).³

The history of the Brotherhood unfolded in five phases. The first phase from 1928 to 1940 is the period of growth as a religious and social reform movement focused on gaining members through grassroots programs that established schools, youth clubs, centers, factories, and mosques. The organization's social welfare network distributed free meals to the needy. The path to change used by the Brotherhood was "mass Islamization through education, and information, acts of charity and welfare on behalf of the community; this period marked the Brotherhood's establishment of a state within a state, filling a void in the government's social programs."⁴ The Muslim Brethren, with bad intentions, performed the functions that should be performed by the state; the Muslim Brethren wanted to divert loyalty of Egyptian citizens from the state to the brotherhood. This represent the first step in weakening the Egyptian state. In its second phase, from 1940 to 1948, the Brotherhood became politicized in the fight against the British occupation and the monarchy of King Farouk.⁵ The Muslim Brotherhood managed to rally the support of some of the Egyptian people at that time because the raised two slogans, the first was that they were resisting the British imperialism and the second, they were doing this in the cause of God . Therefore the Muslim Brotherhood pretended to fight for a national cause and a religious cause . The third phase, 1948-1953 was marked by the Brotherhood's cooperation with revolutionary movements leading to the ousting of the monarchy by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser's Free Officers coup and its uprising against the British control of the Suez Canal. After this period of violence, Al-Banna realized he had lost control of the paramilitary wing. He stated that those who carried out the violence were "neither Brothers nor Muslim."⁶ Despite his denunciation of violence, this episode was a harbinger of the future of the Brotherhood. The Brothers who had picked up arms in 1948 had the experience and the tools to pursue a more violent course. With Al-Banna's death the door was open for the development of a more violent ideology within the Brotherhood.⁷ The fourth phase, 1954 to 1981, was characterized by violent confrontation with Nasser's government, the second outlawing of the Brotherhood, and the rise of an extremist ideology within the Brotherhood that promoted violence to change the government from the top down. These Brotherhood members formed the violent offshoot terrorist organization that assassinated Anwar Sadat.⁸ President Sadat said in one of his speeches that he was mistaken when he released the Muslim Brothers from prisons to confront the leftists.

The fifth phase, from 1981 to 2011, of the group's evolution has been characterized by the Muslim Brotherhood's shift from the violent active revolution ideology of Qutb back to Al-Banna's more moderate approach. The Muslim Brotherhood has tried to distance itself from the violent splinter groups spawned from the earlier Brotherhood ideology. The Brotherhood repudiated violent means as a method of creating their Islamic society. Now the focus of the Brotherhood is on changing the system through the existing political system. Although the Brotherhood remains outlawed as an official political party, they continue to create alliances with sanctioned opposition parties to gain seats in the Egyptian Parliament. They have successfully gained representation in the Egyptian Parliament and control the majority of Egypt's professional

³ Ibid, p1.

⁴ Ron Leshm and Amit Cohen, (October 29, 2001) "Islamic Terror: A History of the Muslim Brotherhood," on-line, Google.

⁵ Tore Kjeilen, (12 Nov 2001.) "Muslim Brotherhood-Egypt," Encyclopedia of the Orient, on-line, Google.

⁶ Politics in God's name," Al-Ahram Weekly, 16-22 November 1995, Al-Ahram Weekly On-line, on-line, Google, 12 Nov 2001.

⁷ Servold, Gary M. (2005), The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Radicalism, Online, p 48.

⁸ Ibid,, p 49.

associations, despite counteractions by Mubarak's government to limit their influence.⁹ Personally speaking, I think that another sixth phase could be added to the five aforementioned phases; this phase starts with the 25th of January 2011 Egyptian Revolution to the present. Although the members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt didn't start with the revolutionists when they begin revolting against Mubarak's regime due to their fear and suspicion of the success of the revolution, they started to engage in the event, on the 28th of January, after they saw the large Egyptian masses in the streets and felt that they would be secured from being arrested by the Egyptian police force. After toppling Mubarak's regime, the military council which presided the authority in Egypt opened the way for the previously banned organization to participate directly in the administration of the Egyptian state through allowing all religious groups including the Muslim Brotherhood organization to establish political parties and to be represented in the Egyptian councils, the People's Council and the Shura (Consultation), Council.

The scope of participation didn't stop to this extent but the religious based parties managed to have the majority in the two councils, but not through real democracy but by gaining the support of the poor and illiterate people in Egypt, who represent roughly 60% of the Egyptian population, by deceiving them by religious slogans "Islam is the Solution" and through the social networks they were able to establish. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded to capture the presidency of Egypt by the election of Mohammed Morsi to become the president of Egypt in June 2012. During Morsi's first year of rule, Egypt faced serious and enumerated drawbacks on the economic, political and strategic level. Due to Morsi's failure to transform Egypt politically and economically, the Egyptian people were highly frustrated and a movement called "Repel" started to collect signatures from the Egyptian people to overthrow Morsi's regime and on the 3rd of June 2013, Morsi was overthrown. After the overthrow of Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood started their violent actions against the Egyptian state and people. They started a sit in in Rabaa Eladwya and El Nahda squares; these sits in were militarized and many Egyptian citizens were kidnapped and tortured to death in these sits in. In addition, military, police and civil institutions were attacked and a big number of people working in these institutions were killed by the militia of the Muslim Brotherhood. From the sixth stage, we can deduce that violence is inherent in the mentality of the Muslim Brotherhood. When they couldn't achieve their goals, they revert to the use of force and aggression.

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IDEOLOGY

The brotherhood ideology was formulated by its two main luminaries, its founder Hassan EL Banna and Sayyid Qutb. Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the modern Muslim Brotherhood movement, was highly influenced by Rashid Rida's thought. Rashid Rida called for a reexamination of his predecessors' ideas; he considered the Muslim world to be weak compared to the West, yet his suggested method of rectifying the situation was different: instead of Westernization, a return to the roots of Islam, the implementation of Islamic religious law (Sharia), and the establishment of a Sharia state. Hassan al-Banna developed Rashid Rida's ideas into a social organization dedicated to the implementation of those principles.¹⁰ Alongside the Muslim Brotherhood's rapid expansion in the 1930s, Al-Banna wrote five risalat (letters) to his young, educated supporters. The ideas he set forth in the letters are still the pillars of the movement's worldview. Al Banna regarded the adoption of man-made legislation by Muslim leaders as a contemporary replacement for the law of Sharia as surrendering to the influences of the West. According to al Banna; *Allah* is the only legitimate source of law for man and that man-made laws have no place in an Islamic State. Additionally; al Banna viewed Islam as complete and all-encompassing system of governance which was to be universally applied to the governance of the state, all private matters

⁹ Ibid., p 51.

¹⁰ The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center Online Report, June 19, 2011, p14.

– *personal and familial*, as well as to every aspect of public life.¹¹ Al Banna; through the efforts of *Dawa* being put forth by the Brotherhood, sought the establishment of an Islamic State by Islamization from below as a bottom up process (from the individual to the society as a whole) for the creation of the desired State. However; driven by the fact that this would inevitably prove to be a painfully slow and methodical process, certain elements within the Muslim Brotherhood believed that a more direct approach was required. Consequently; these elements created and implemented an apparatus for the use of violence in the pursuit of their concept for an Islamic State.¹² Al-Banna listed seven stages to achieve these objectives, each to be carried out in a gradual fashion; the stages are divided into social and political: the first three are based on educating the individual, the family, and the entire society of the Muslim world to implement Sharia laws in every aspect of daily life. The next four stages are political by nature and include assuming power through elections, shaping a Sharia state, liberating Islamic countries from the burden of (physical and ideological) foreign occupation, uniting them into one Islamic entity (“new caliphate”) and spreading Islamic values throughout the world.¹³

The growth of the Muslim Brotherhood’s radical faction is associated with Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), a senior ideologue in the movement’s Egyptian branch. In the 1950s and 1960. Qutb wrote several books (some during his prison term) supplementing Al-Banna’s ideas with a radical spirit. Qutb’s fundamental criticism of all systems of life which he views as non- Islamic is that they are “*jahiliyyah*”.¹⁴ *Jahiliyyah* is ignorance of divine guidance. *Jahiliyyah* encapsulates Qutb’s entire critique of the West, the Soviet Union, Nasser’s government, and any government which does not follow God’s divine guidance. For Qutb, in the final analysis, each of these regimes is fundamentally the same because they ignore God’s authority over man and his actions. By ignoring God’s revelation, man rebels “against the sovereignty of God on earth”.¹⁵ Qutb sees the world in black and white. There are Islamic societies and *jahili* societies. Islamic societies live the true life, submitting to God and completely conforming to his divine guidance in all matters; meanwhile, *jahili* societies ignore God’s guidance and submit to man-made laws and conform to manmade ways of life.¹⁶ Qutb envisioned the upcoming battle between Islam and the West, and he wrote that the battle would be part of *jihad*.¹⁷ The traditional Islamic definition for *jihad* is to struggle in the cause of God; Qutb argues that the cause of God is to “establish His order and way of life in the world.” Muslims are commanded to fight those who do not submit to one God: “Fight them until there is no more oppression, and submission is made to God alone” (Qur’an 2:193). According to Qutb, the cause of God is to end oppression by creating a social order that is purely Islamic; such a social order will be governed by the laws of the Shari’ah and the spiritual principles of the Qur’an.¹⁸ The cause of God cannot aim to make only small changes, for no compromises can be made when men struggle to establish truth. As a practical code for living, Islam cannot be relegated to merely the theoretical realm, for it becomes meaningless. For these reasons, the cause of God (Islam) demands that a completely Islamic social order be established.¹⁹ Because he views non-Islamic society as oppression, Qutb believes that *jihad* is a “universal declaration of the freedom of man from slavery to other men and to his own desires; Qutb makes it clear that

¹¹ SorrentinoDiana,(2011)Muslim Brotherhood Understanding the Origin, Ideology, Agenda, Organizational Structure and Ideological Influences of the Muslim Brotherhood,BRG Research & Intelligence Group www.brgresearchgroup.com, p 1.

¹²Ibid, p1.

¹³Ibid, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, p16.

¹⁴ This term, literally translated as ignorance, is used by most Muslims “to designate the pre-Islamic society of the Arabian peninsula.” *Jahiliyya* was often used in Muslim historiography to describe non-Muslim societies, much in the same way in which “barbarism” was used in the Western tradition to describe non-Western peoples .

¹⁵ Qutb, Sayyid. *Milestones* (Indianapolis, 1990), pp.i-iii.

¹⁶ Lopoda,Luke, (2004), The Thoughts Of SayyidD Qutb, *the Ashbrook Scholar program, having majored in Integrated Social Studies Education.*, p 4.

¹⁷ Qutb, Sayyid. *In the Shade of the Qur’an*(2003), The Islamic Foundation, vol.3, p224.

¹⁸ Ibid, Lopoda,Luke, p 19.

¹⁹Ibid, *Milestones*, p 51.

jihad must be waged universally. By proclaiming jihad as a universal cause, Qutb declared Islam as an alternative civilization for all people, not only Muslims.²⁰ Moreover, Qutb claims that jihad is waged against institutions and organizations, not against individuals. Jahili institutions are the enemy, not the people who live under the jahili system. Indeed, humans are always the beneficiaries of jihad; however if the people who live under these institutions support them, they become targets of Jihad too and in this case jihad will not be confined to the Jahili institutions but the Jahili individuals as well.²¹ The main jahili institutions that Qutb refers to as targets of jihad include government organizations that possess power over jahili society and allow society to conform to non-Islamic ideals. Qutb commands Muslims to wage jihad by striking “hard at all those political powers that force people to bow to their will and authority, defying the commandments of Allah, and denying people the freedom to listen to the message of Islam, and to accept it even when they wish to do so.”²²

Qutb prescribed two methods for waging jihad against jahili institutions, preaching and ‘movement’. Preaching is the process of waging a war of ideas on the philosophical plane; It is the non-violent promotion of Islamic beliefs through public speech, demonstrations, and missionary work. Preaching is essential to jihad because it provides ideological justification, without a war of ideas, jihad would be unsubstantiated violence.²³ On the other hand, Qutb says that preaching by itself is not enough because “those who have usurped the authority of Allah and are oppressing Allah’s creatures are not going to give up their power merely through preaching.”²⁴ Along with preaching, jihad must employ movement. Qutb defines movement as the method of jihad which “tackles material obstacles”.²⁵ It is the war of ideas put into action; thus, movement is violence against jahili institutions. Although he knows that movement requires violence, Qutb is reluctant to call it so by name. Instead of violence, Qutb views movement as the necessary consequence of preaching. Just as a Muslim contradicts his faith if he submits to jahiliyyah, a Muslim contradicts his preaching if he refuses to physically put his words into action.²⁶

While Qutb believes that the ultimate goal of jihad is to establish an Islamic society, he does not view this ideal society as new. His vision is a restoration, not an innovation. According to Qutb, this revival aims to restore society to its original Godly intent. Hence, the reemergence of an Islamic society is a restoration of two societies in history: the first community of mankind and the first Qur’anic generation that lived under Muhammad.²⁷ Qutb views Islamic society as a restoration of the original community, which was unified under God’s authority prior to the deviation of jahiliyyah. The creation of an ideal Islamic society would also be a restoration of what Qutb refers to as the ‘unique Qur’anic generation; this generation was made up of the first Muslims and the community in which they lived. Qutb believes that no community before or since has reached the excellence of this generation. Qutb argues that this first generation of Muslims is unique for three significant reasons which must be emulated by the new Islamic society. First, they followed the Qur’an alone as their guide.²⁸ The second characteristic of the first generation of Muslims is that they had living faith because they regarded the Qur’an as an instruction book. Lastly, the first Muslims, once they embraced Islam, separated themselves from jahiliyyah immediately and completely. Qutb believes that they fully rejected any jahili environment and clung to Islam and the Qur’an. They did not compromise or mix their Islamic instructions with the instruction of jahili society.

²⁰ Ibid, pp. 48-61.

²¹ Ibid, p49.

²² Ibid, Lopoda, Luke, p 20.

²³ Ibid, p 21.

²⁴ Ibid, Milestones, p 48.

²⁵ Ibid, p 48.

²⁶ Ibid, Qutb, Sayyid. In the Shade of the Qur’an, vol., 3, p 282.

²⁷ Ibid, Lopoda, Luke, p 24.

²⁸ Ibid, Qutb, Sayyid. In the Shade of the Qur’an, vol.1, pp 312-314

Because they no longer put value in jahiliyyah, “no pressure from the jahili society could have any effect on [their] firm resolve.”²⁹

From the above-mentioned ideological context, it is obvious that the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to establish the Islamic state based on the restoration of the historical Islamic Caliphate, which Sayyid Qutb called the Qur’anic generation, and then expand its authority over the entire world, dismantling not only the non-Islamic governments but also the Islamic governments which don’t apply the Sharia law (Islamic Code). Both governments, non-Islamic governments and Islamic governments which don’t apply the Sharia law are considered non-Muslims. For achieving this objective, preaching and persuasion aren’t sufficient at all; nonetheless, Jihad (violence) is highly required to obtain the objective, the establishment of Islamic state, and preserve and keep it secure. Jihad is a central tenet in the Muslim brotherhood ideology. Hassan al Banna, in a booklet entitled “Jihad” defined Jihad as violent warfare against non-Muslims to establish Islam as dominant across the entire world. Hence, disrupting the world order through dismantling governments by the use of force and violence not only threatens specific societies but the entire international community as well. In the following section, I will shed light upon the bases of the Islamic state, according to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and how violence represents a significant tool for the Brotherhood to establish such a state and protect it.

THE PROCLAIMED ISLAMIC STATE

When reading al-Banna, one must consider that his works served not only as theoretical expositions of his views, but also as political manifestos intended for his followers and also for The Muslim Brothers; potential followers and political allies, and even censors.³⁰ Perhaps the best place to begin an exposition of al-Banna’s views is with his analysis of the history of the Arabs, Muslims, and Egyptians, presented in “Between Yesterday and Today.” Al-Banna’s history ignores the pre-Islamic Arab and Egyptian past altogether, and begins with a glorious description of the first Islamic Caliphate – described in a manner reminiscent of so many secular nationalist mythologies, which inevitably hearken back to some bygone “golden age.” This golden age, however, is not Arab but Muslim – al-Banna always speaks of the “Islamic state” and the “Islamic *umma*.”³¹ The question of nationality and nationalism raises its head in the Islamic *umma* only as a result of European involvement and, specifically, as a reaction to European colonialism. However, the national awakening of the Islamic nations constitutes merely a transitory period in al-Banna’s teleological view of history. This awakening of nationalism among the Muslim peoples is the result of the destruction of the Islamic *umma* by the Europeans. However, national sentiments among Muslims will eventually subside when the Islamic Caliphate is reestablished.³² Nationalism seems to be an understandable response to Western oppression of Muslims and, more importantly, in the grand scheme of history it appears to play a positive role – it constitutes a stepping stone to the political unification of all Muslim lands. The narrative of Arab peoples receives a privileged position within al-Banna’s presentation of the history of Islam. For example, one of the causes al-Banna provides for the slow degeneration of the original Caliphate is the “transfer of political authority to non-Arabs – i.e., Persians at one time, Daylamites at another, Mamluks, Turks, and others – who had never absorbed genuine Islam.” Furthermore, he takes pains to point out that the Islamic conquest was synonymous with

²⁹Ibid, Milestones, p 15.

³⁰ Brykczynski, Paul, (2005), *Radical Islam and the Nation: The Relationship between Religion and Nationalism in the Political Thought of Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb*, <http://www.ucalgary.ca/hic> • ISSN 1492-7810 2005 • Vol. 5, No. 1, p 6.

³¹ Hassan Al-Banna, “Between Yesterday and Today” in *The Five Tracts of Hassan al-Banna*, ed. Charles Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 13-39. See also in *The Five Tracts*, “Our Mission,” 40-68, and “Toward the Light,” 103-132.

³²Ibid, p24.

the conquest of Arab culture.³³ Al-Banna's political thought on the subject of nationalism is characterized by a great degree of tactical flexibility. In his open letter to King Faruq and to other Muslim leaders, written in 1948, he is willing to make the argument that "Islam is guaranteed to supply the renescent nation with its needs."³⁴ Hence, al-Banna appears to be endorsing Islam on the grounds that it will make the nation stronger. In reality, however, his political vision reverses this relationship. National liberation is only a tactical goal, a stepping stone in the journey towards the creation of a universal Islamic state³⁵:

*(National liberation] would represent to the Muslim Brotherhood merely a part of the way, or simply a single stage of it. For after that, it still remains for them to strive to raise the standard of the Islamic Fatherland on high over all the regions of the earth, and to unfurl the banner of the Quran everywhere.)*³⁶

Al-Banna seems to be of the opinion that the Islamic state will come into being piecemeal. In all likelihood, its foundations will be laid by the Muslim Brothers in the "Nile valley." It will gradually spread to "the Arab domain," and only in the end will it come to pass "in every land which God has made fortunate through the Islamic creed."³⁷ Here it is clear that Al-Banna was talking in a political not a religious context as God ordered the spread of Islam as a religion and even in spreading Islam as a religion, no compulsion should take place as it is mentioned in Quran "No compulsion in Religion. Therefore, according to Al-Banna's thought, the Islamic state which he dreamt of would destroy any national borders it would face starting from the Arab neighbor states to all states in the world. This, of course, represents a serious violation of international law and its principles, especially the principle of sovereignty. In summary, undoubtedly for al-Banna, the primary political allegiance of a good Muslim should be to Islam, rather than to any tribal, ethnic, or civic notions of "nationality."³⁸ This means the elimination of loyalty to home which is fatal to state's security and existence. The existence of non-Islamic forms of identity among Muslims is accepted, but al-Banna treats these identities tactically and instrumentally. By helping to raise the self-awareness of the Muslim peoples, they will act as steppingstones to the ultimate goal of an Islamic state. They must never, however, be allowed to become ends in themselves.³⁹

Unlike al-Banna's writings, Qutb contrasts the Muslim *umma*, understood not simply as a spiritual community but as a "nation" or political community aspiring for its own state, with the non-Muslim world of jahiliyya. Qutb, however, defines jahiliyya in contemporary and highly political terms "If we look at the sources and foundation of the modern modes of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in jahiliyya. This jahiliyya is based on rebellion against the sovereignty of [God] on earth. It attempts to transfer to man one of the greatest attributes of [God], namely sovereignty, by making some men lord over others."⁴⁰ This formulation is truly radical and unprecedented in that it places all regimes that are not governed directly by what "God has prescribed" in the realm of the *jahiliyya*, and thus beyond the pale of Islam. Considering Qutb's definition of the true Muslim *umma*, this includes virtually all the regimes of the Muslim world. Qutb's definition places any state that claims to draw its legitimacy from representing the interests of the *nation* constituting it, firmly in the camp of the un-Islamic forces of *jahiliyya*.⁴¹ In Qutb's vision of the world, and not only of the Muslim world,

³³ *ibid*, pp. 18-21.

³⁴ Al-Banna, Hassan. "Toward the Light." In *The Five Tracts of Hassan al-Banna*, edited by Charles Wendell, 103-132. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, p 52

³⁵ *Ibid*, Brykczynski, Paul, p 9.

³⁶ Al-Banna, Hassan. "Our Mission." In *The Five Tracts of Hassan al-Banna*, edited by Charles Wendell, 40-68. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975., p 107.

³⁷ *Ibid*, Hassan Al-Banna, "Between Yesterday and Today", p 36.

³⁸ *Ibid*, Brykczynski, Paul, p 9.

³⁹ *Ibid*, p10.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, Qutb, *Milestones*, p 8.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p22.

the question of nationality plays a relatively minor role. The primary political division among human beings is between the Islamic *umma* and the world of anti-Islamic *jahiliyya* or, in terms Qutb borrows from the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, between the domain of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*) and the domain of war (*Dar al-Harb*).⁴² From Qutb's perspective, these divisions constitute the only legitimate political distinctions that the Muslims can draw: "a Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a member of the Muslim community in *dar-al-Islam*."⁴³ Clearly, Qutb's thought has no place for the "concentric circles" of identity which both al-Banna and Nasser refer to in their respective discussions of nationality.⁴⁴ For Qutb, a "firmly established" Muslim identity will necessarily cause the "disappearance" of all other forms of social identification.⁴⁵ For a true Muslim, the issue of "national" identity will simply cease to exist; Qutb does not appear to see this process as a struggle, but merely as a natural development along the path of faith. Qutb's vision of the Islamic *umma* allows for no shades of grey and not even the faintest local attachments which could get in the way of a Muslim's Islamic identity.⁴⁶ Islamic ends call for Islamic means — using *jahaili* methods to secure an Islamic end will inevitably corrupt that end.⁴⁷ Since nationalism is the creation of *jahiliyya*, it cannot be used in the cause of the Islamic *umma*. Indeed, Qutb theorizes that the Prophet Muhammad himself could have mobilized the tribes of Arabia by "kindling among his compatriots the fire of Arab nationalism," and then using his authority to impose upon them belief in Islam.

This path, according to Qutb, could have sped up the spread of Islam and been very effective in overcoming the opposition of the political leaders of Mecca to the new religion. According to Qutb, however, the "all-knowing and all-wise Allah did not lead his prophet . . . on this course" because, once unleashed, the sovereignty of the nation would have been a challenge to the sovereignty of God. In the end, Qutb's opposition to nationalism, in any shape or form, is implacable. All forms of identity not rooted directly in Islam belong to *jahiliyya* and the world of war, as do all forms of political authority that do not emanate directly from God.⁴⁸ Since "Islam has both the obligation and the right to release mankind from servitude to human beings so that they may serve [God] alone," nationalism, as an ideology which gives political legitimacy to the "nation," emerges as an irreconcilable enemy of every Muslim, both conceptually and in practice.⁴⁹

From the aforementioned information, we can say that Qutb's view exceeded the ideas of Al-Banna, the invasion of other states and destroying all national boundaries as Qutb classified states in a hierarchical shape on the top of which stands the Islamic state and its Muslim citizens, the state of knowledge. Then in the bottom of the shape stands all Non-Islamic states which don't apply the Sharia Law; these states are the Jahili states (ignorant states) regardless of the history, civilization and culture of these states. What is ridiculous about this thought is that it is highly contradictory to Islam as a religion; Quran and the prophet Mohammed (Peace Be upon Him) stressed the respect of the other's, his civilization, history, culture and religion, we are ordered to spread Islam and show other people Islam's justice and tolerance.

JIHAD: THE USE OF VIOLENCE

The basic pillars or long-term plan of action of the Muslim Brotherhood includes, first, the establishment of Islamic Sharia law; second, establishment of Muslim states; and third, the unification of Muslim nations. These steps are

⁴²Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Conception of Justice* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), pp.161-173.

⁴³Ibid, Qutb, *Milestones*, p 103.

⁴⁴Ibid, Qutb, *Milestones*, p 101.

⁴⁵Ibid, Qutb, *Milestones*, p101.

⁴⁶Ibid, Qutb, *Milestones*, p109.

⁴⁷Ibid, Qutb, *Milestones*, p 34.

⁴⁸Ibid, Qutb, *Milestones*, pp.21-22.

⁴⁹Ibid, Qutb, *Milestones*, p61.

directly tied to their Islamic doctrine.⁵⁰ Living among rival religions and hostile tribes necessitated a strong bond between like-minded believers. Physical struggles with non-believers forced Muslims to band together. While there are divergent sects and local variations in the practice of the Islamic faith, a clear distinction exists between believers and non-believers. The Muslim Brotherhood capitalizes on this unifying force as an ideology for the creation of a greater Muslim state and Islamic world. The Muslim Brotherhood exploits and promotes this communal religious unification as a protection measure, recruiting tool, and a call to arms for Muslims to defend their brethren throughout the world. It is this sense of religious ideological unity that mobilized the “Arab Afghans” to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. From Bosnia to Sudan to Indonesia to the Philippines, protection of the umma is a familiar call to arms for militant Islamic fundamentalists and the Muslim Brotherhood.⁵¹ The protection of the umma is tied to the Islamic concept of *jihad*. Jihad is a multi-dimensional concept with the primary focus on the individual. At the individual level it is striving to live a good life in accordance with the Quran, being just, performing righteous deeds, protecting people’s rights and freedoms, spreading the faith, and personally defending the faith. It is about the individual’s spiritual struggle for “submission” (English for Islam) to God’s will that is good and just, not evil.⁵² At the collective level it is the development, expansion, and protection of a global Islamic community. Jihad at this level may involve addressing injustices through fighting to deter an attack, protecting the freedom to practice Islam, freeing the oppressed, and protecting oneself. The Muslim Brotherhood’s inclusion of “jihad our way” in their slogan has multiple meanings. It promotes a non-violent individual struggle for submission to God’s will while allowing for the application of violent means, war in the name of God, when fighting a perceived injustice.⁵³

Moreover, not only does the Muslim Brotherhood commit the violent actions by its members, but the Muslim Brotherhood has ideological connections, leadership connections, and shared modus operandi with many terrorist organizations. The most common linkages between Islamic terrorist organizations and the Muslim Brotherhood are the shared goal of establishing an Islamic state or nation and the shared view of jihad as a means to this goal. Of the thirty-three organizations listed on the U.S. State Department’s Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization List, sixteen are engaged in terrorism to force the creation of an Islamic state.⁵⁴ The leadership and founders of many of the modern terrorist organizations had their early indoctrination in Islamic fundamentalist ideas through the Muslim Brotherhood. Ramzi Yousef, convicted in the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, “admitted he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, but left the group in the 1990s after deciding they were not adequately committed to the revolutionary Islamic cause.”⁵⁵ The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood is evident in the leadership, strategic objectives, and methods of the al Qaeda (The World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders) terrorist network. This organization is a fusion of several groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, and Abu Sayyuf; some of the major militant influences on the organization, and its leader Osama bin Laden, were expatriate Muslim Brotherhood members in Saudi Arabia.⁵⁶ Examples that point to the significant roles that Muslim Brotherhood members have played as leaders of terrorist organizations, where they have adopted many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s methods are numerous and varied, e.g., the 1993 bombing of the World Trade

⁵⁰ Ibid, Servold, p 56.

⁵¹ Ibid, Servold, p57.

⁵² Ibid, p. 57.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 58.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, (Washington, DC.: Office of the Secretary of State, May 2002), p.85.

⁵⁵ Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism* (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999), p.118.

⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*, 105.

Center, the 1998 Luxor, Egypt attack by Islamic Jihad that killed 58 tourists, the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania by al Qaeda, and the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attack by al Qaeda operatives.⁵⁷

CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The Brotherhood is a global organization with insurgency objectives and methods that threaten existing secular governments in North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia. The Muslim Brotherhood's strategic objective is the Islamization of society in strict adherence to selected Islamic doctrine and the establishment of Islamic theocracies.⁵⁸ The Muslim Brotherhood's ideological ties to, and involvement in, the leadership of terrorist organizations threatens the security of the international community. The Muslim Brotherhood represents a challenge to the goals of "enhancing security at the international level, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights."⁵⁹ The Brotherhood represents a challenge to the international values of freedom of religion, separation of church and state, equality of the individual, and human rights. Their stated objectives leave little room for the democratic concepts of political compromise, majority rule, and minority rights. The Brotherhood everywhere advocates the integration of their interpretation of Islamic precepts into the existing secular government structure, the establishment of Islamic theocracies, the use of international terrorism to further their cause, the manipulation of NGOs to support their cause, and the use of Muslim Brotherhood mujahidin to serve as a Brotherhood foreign legion in the internal conflicts of other Islamic states.⁶⁰ Everywhere it exists, the Muslim Brotherhood's activities range from political party activism to promoting an insurgency that uses terrorism as a tool.⁶¹ The Muslim Brotherhood's past strategies pointedly show how this supposedly non-violent organization aids and sustains radical Islamic groups who resort to violent means if their popular efforts are subverted. From the ranks of the Brotherhood, members have answered the call to "Jihad" in Palestine, Bosnia, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Chechnya. In Algeria, Syria, and Egypt the Brotherhood serves as the umbrella organization promoting armed struggles. The Brotherhood in different states moves between different phases of a classical insurgency. In some Islamic states they remain in the initial organizational phase where they initiate a pattern of organized activities and minor incidents. In other states, they operate at a second phase where the level of violence has grown to guerrilla warfare interspersed with terrorist acts to undermine the existing regime.⁶² Finally, in several states the Brotherhood has participated in a third phase, where there is open fighting between organized armed insurgent forces and the armed forces of the existing authority. The history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, Egypt, and Israel provide examples of the Muslim Brotherhood's movement through successive insurgent phases. Syria and Egypt also demonstrate the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to revert to an earlier phase when government actions have defeated the insurgency and driven it underground.⁶³

On the domestic level, the seven characteristics of insurgency outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Forces, FM 31-20-3, relating to leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, phasing and timing, and organizational and operational patterns

⁵⁷ Ibid, Servold, p. 68.

⁵⁸ Nachman Tal, "A Decade of Fundamentalism: The Egyptian and Jordanian Experience in Coping with Radical Islam," Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Publication, 1-5, on-line, Internet, 6 December 2001. Available from <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/tal.html>.

⁵⁹ The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office), p1.

⁶⁰ Ibid, Servold, p. 72

⁶¹ U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20-3. FM 31-20-3

⁶² Ibid, Servold, p. 72

⁶³ Ibid, p. 72

provide a useful construct for the development of an engagement and containment strategy which include the following steps:

- Engaging the Brotherhood in dialogue is an important first step to reducing the potential for destabilization in many states.
- Along with engagement, a deliberate program of containment to minimize the Brotherhood's influence is necessary.
- The containment program should seek to promote an information campaign supporting non-violent forms of "Jihad" in accordance with the Islamic values of peace, human life sanctity, and non-violence.
- The containment program also must find ways to limit and curb NGO external support to the Muslim Brotherhood.

On the international levels some corrective steps could also be implemented, these include:

- Define what constitutes a legitimate NGO in both international and national laws.
- Provide governmental oversight and access to NGO financial records, donor records, charters, objectives, and membership rolls.
- Enforce a code of ethical performance.
- Outlaw NGOs that are unwilling to provide full disclosure of their activities and who they fund.
- Deny illegitimate NGOs access to public forums.
- Provide more aid through legitimate NGO programs to reduce the poverty, illiteracy, poor health, and sense of despair among the disaffected in society where illegitimate NGOs and terrorists best operate.
- Carefully evaluate the secondary effect of NGO programs to prevent inadvertent assistance or support to terrorists.⁶⁴

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